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Don Frederico

This author Don Frederico has created 17 entries.

When you get what you pay for: the First Circuit examines the injury requirement under Massachusetts chapter 93A.

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On July 26th, the First Circuit issued rulings in putative consumer class actions brought by the same attorney against two national department store chains, challenging their allegedly deceptive use of comparative pricing on their in-store price tags.  In the first case, brought against Nordstrom, the court engaged in a careful review of a series of Massachusetts decisions interpreting the state’s consumer protection act, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A.  In the second case, against Kohl’s, the court continued the analysis to fill a procedural gap left open in the first case.  In the end, the court reinforced the Massachusetts cases holding that proof of an unfair or deceptive act or practice, without more, is not sufficient to support a claim under the Massachusetts statute.  Rather, plaintiffs must also prove that the violation caused them harm.  Because plaintiffs in these cases did not allege that products themselves were other than represented, but only that they subjectively believed that they were getting a good bargain, the court held that they failed

Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.: Meal Periods, Ascertainability, and the Importance of Removal.

In Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., five former Shift Supervisors brought a putative class action against CVS under the Massachusetts Wage Act, contending they were required to work through their unpaid breaks.  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were required to remain in the store during their breaks when they were the only managerial employees on duty, were interrupted to handle transactions when necessary, and were nonetheless not paid for their time.  In a 12-page opinion issued last week, United States District Judge Rya Zobel denied the plaintiffs’ request for class certification, finding they failed to satisfy the requirements of commonality and predominance under Rule 23.

Although CVS policy required a member of management to be present in the store at all times during operating hours, the policy also provided employees with one unpaid 30-minute meal break for each six or eight-hour shift, and instructed employees that, in the event their meal period was interrupted, they should notify their manager to

Justice Thomas’ Concurring Opinion in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker: A Useful Reminder

On June 12th, the Supreme Court issued its unsurprising decision in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, addressing a relatively recent twist concerning the appealability of orders denying class certification.  The case resulted in unanimous agreement among the eight Justices who participated in it (Justice Gorsuch did not participate), but a five-three split among them as to whether the case should be decided on statutory grounds (supported by the majority) or constitutional grounds (supported by the minority).  In the course of the debate over the decision’s rationale, Justice Thomas penned a paragraph that serves as a useful reminder concerning the nature of putative class litigation.

Of all the Court’s class certification cases, this must have been one of the easiest to decide.  Put simply, the district court struck plaintiffs’ class allegations from the complaint, based on a class certification denial in an earlier case raising the same claims.  After plaintiffs unsuccessfully petitioned the Ninth Circuit for interlocutory review under Rule 23(f), they were left with

Multi-State Class Actions After the Supreme Court’s Decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court

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On June 19th, the Supreme Court issued a decision that could have important consequences for multi-state class actions.  In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, the Court addressed the question whether a California state court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident plaintiffs who had joined a group of California plaintiffs in suing Bristol-Myers Squibb (“BMS”) for alleged adverse health effects from its drug, Plavix.  As a matter of 14th Amendment due process, the Court held that the nonresidents’ claims should have been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Initially, the nonresident plaintiffs succeeded in the state courts in arguing that the courts could exercise general jurisdiction over BMS, but the California Court of Appeal reversed itself after SCOTUS issued its 2014 decision in Daimler Ag v. Bauman (holding that a court could not assert general jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate defendant solely because it engaged “in a substantial, continuous and systematic course of business” in the

District of New Hampshire Denies Remand Under CAFA’s Local Controversy Exception

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On November 30th, in Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., United States District Judge Joseph Laplante of the District of New Hampshire denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand two related class action lawsuits based on allegations that defendants had caused a release of toxic chemicals from a manufacturing plant that contaminated nearby wells and water supplies.  One lawsuit was brought on behalf of a putative class of current owners of residential properties with private groundwater wells within two miles of the manufacturing site, and sought damages for the alleged diminished values of their properties. The other lawsuit was brought on behalf of a putative class of current and former residents of such properties, and sought to recover the costs of medical monitoring. The defendants are the company that owns the plant and the individual plant manager. They removed the case to federal court under CAFA, and plaintiffs moved to remand, citing CAFA’s local controversy exception.

The local controversy exception requires district courts to decline

Bellerman v. Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. – Lack of Injury in Massachusetts Consumer Claims

In 2014, we posted about the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co.  In that case, plaintiffs sought relief under the Massachusetts consumer protection statute, G.L. c. 93A, because of the defendant utility’s alleged failure properly to prepare and plan for a major winter storm, and its allegedly deceptive communications made to consumers before and during the storm.  The SJC affirmed the trial court’s denial of class certification because plaintiffs could not establish that defendant’s conduct caused similar injury to consumers on a class-wide basis.

On remand, plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for class certification relying on a different liability theory – that they had suffered economic injury by overpaying for a level of emergency preparedness, required by Department of Public Utility regulations, which the defendant allegedly failed to provide.  This time a different trial court judge certified two classes under this diminution-in-value theory (a business customers class and a residential customers class), but

District of Massachusetts Grapples with Campbell-Ewald’s Unanswered Questions

Chief Judge Saris and Judge Sorokin of the District of Massachusetts recently tackled questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court’s opinion earlier this year in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (see Don Frederico’s prior post for a full discussion of Campbell-Ewald).

In South Orange Chiropractic Center, LLC v. Cayan LLC, 2016 WL 1441791, No. 15-13069 (D. Mass. April 12, 2016), the defendant, seeking to slip through the door left ajar by Campbell-Ewald, sought to deposit $7,500 with the court, providing the named plaintiff in a putative Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) class action with full relief. In addition, the defendant agreed to have judgment entered against it for allegedly sending plaintiff an unsolicited fax in violation of the TCPA, to pay for costs, to be enjoined from future conduct as to plaintiff or others, and to preserve evidence, and presented the plaintiff with a stand-alone settlement agreement,