Massachusetts Decisions

Part 4: Making a COVID-19 Tuition Suit Last

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We recently highlighted two Boston-based COVID-19 tuition refund class action suits, against Brandeis University and Boston College, and the impact of a provision in the Commonwealth’s Fiscal Year 2024 Budget that grants retroactive immunity from claims arising out of tuition or fees paid for the Spring 2020 term. In both cases, with orders issued just days apart, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Boston found that provision, Section 80(b), was reasonable and narrowly tailored and therefore not unconstitutional. In the Brandeis case, the ruling ended the matter entirely, whereas the case against BC will proceed as to the non-Spring 2020 semesters.

A Refresher on the Boston-Based Cases

In Part 2 of our series, we reviewed the legal backdrop of this wave of class action litigation and explored some common pitfalls in education-based claims, building off of our initial post, which focused on suits against Suffolk University and Boston University. In

The Budget Saves Brandeis: An Update on COVID-19 Tuition Litigation

In Part 2 of our series on our Massachusetts and Boston-based COVID-19 tuition refund class action suits, we reviewed the legal backdrop of this wave of class action litigation and explored some common pitfalls in education-based claims, noting that even where cases are able to proceed based on adequate framing of the claims and underlying facts, many lose their steam when a university successfully argues for denial of plaintiffs’ attempts to pursue their cases as class actions. One example of a Boston-area case in which class certification that we discussed was the May 2023 denial in Omori v. Brandeis University, which was dismissed earlier this month for an entirely different reason. We discuss that below, along with a similar ruling in Rodrigues v. Boston College issued just days prior.

Immunity for Tuition Claims in the 2024 Budget

Despite the defeat of its attempt to certify the proposed class (as well as the First Circuit’s denial of plaintiffs’

Part 2 – Slowing the Spread of Litigation: An Update on First Circuit COVID-19 Tuition Refund Class Actions

Part 2: The Legal Backdrop

In Part 1 of this series, we provided a brief overview and introduction of the Boston-based COVID-19 tuition refund class action cases, noting generally that most similar suits haven’t made it very far, as courts tend to rule early and often for the educational institution. Below is a brief discussion of some common pitfalls that have repeatedly plagued this type of litigation.

Framing the Case

One threshold hurdle is that COVID-19 tuition reimbursement cases against public colleges and universities are often dismissed in the earliest stages of litigation under sovereign immunity, leaving cases against private institutions with the most possibility for advancement. Even in those cases, however, courts often find that plaintiffs’ claims are not properly framed. For example, although some states permit claims for educational malpractice, plaintiffs often run into problems in attempting to establish a basis on which to evaluate the quality of services provided by the educational institution. To

Slowing the Spread of Litigation: An Update on First Circuit COVID-19 Tuition Refund Class Actions

Part 1: Introduction and Overview

Earlier this month, Boston University prevailed in one of the few surviving Boston-based COVID-19 tuition refund class action suits. The U.S. District Court in Boston granted BU’s Motion for Summary Judgment finding that BU “did not make an open-ended promise to provide an ‘on-campus experience’ in exchange for a ‘semester cost.’” Unlike student-plaintiffs in other, largely unsuccessful COVID tuition refund litigation, the plaintiffs in this case made arguments based not on the difference in quality of in-person versus online education but rather based on their contracts with the university, which plaintiffs said constituted a “binding promise to provide students in-person instruction (or tuition refunds should in-person classes become unavailable), a promise on which students relied in prospectively paying their tuition.” Although the Court disagreed, Judge Richard Stearns, citing a still-live COVID tuition litigation case against Brandeis University, found that “BU must still provide restitution for the difference in value between what they were

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Reverses Denial of Motion to Compel Arbitration, Holds Grubhub Drivers Must Arbitrate Employment Claims

On July 27, 2022, in Archer v. Grubhub, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered whether Grubhub delivery drivers within the Commonwealth are exempt from arbitration under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). FAA Section 1 exempts “seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The SJC joined numerous other courts in determining such drivers are not a class of transportation workers exempt from the FAA and that the electronic arbitration agreements with class action waivers among the drivers and Grubhub are binding. The ruling reversed the Superior Court judge’s denial of Grubhub’s motion to compel arbitration.

Section 1 of the FAA Does Not Exempt Grubhub Drivers

At the heart of the case was an electronic agreement among the plaintiff drivers and Grubhub that was executed through an online portal through which the plaintiffs had to activate a hyperlink titled “Arbitration Agreement” with an option to view the text of the

Is It Time to Update Mass. R. Civ. P. 23?

Over the past 25 years, I have had the good fortune of getting to know and working with both plaintiff and defendant class action lawyers from many states, and to teach class action practice in dozens of local and national CLE programs and at a great law school. I also have represented clients in class action cases in many jurisdictions, both state and federal, including the state courts of Massachusetts. All of these experiences have given me the opportunity over an extended period to learn and reflect upon the varieties of class action practice.

When I speak with my counterparts from other states, one thing I tell them invariably makes their jaws drop — namely, that Massachusetts’ version of Rule 23 does not allow opt outs. I have not done an exhaustive review of all state class action rules, but based on my experience and my interactions with out-of-state class action lawyers, we seem to be the only state that does not permit class members to

Kingara v. Secure Home Health Care Inc. and the Precertification Powers of the Massachusetts Courts

The Backdrop

Class actions are like butterflies; they must undergo a metamorphosis before they fly. The transformation occurs when a court grants class certification. At that instant, what had started out as an individual lawsuit emerges as its own entity, with a number of legal consequences flowing from the change. Among them, plaintiff’s counsel becomes class counsel, representing and owing fiduciary duties to the entire class; the court also becomes a fiduciary, charged with its own responsibility for protecting absent class members (including, importantly, the duty to scrutinize proposed class settlements); and class members become represented parties, which triggers the ethical rules that limit or prohibit defense counsel from communicating with them.

The situation before class certification is different. Because the class does not yet exist, most courts recognize that the fiduciary duties of plaintiff’s counsel and the court to putative class members do not kick in (or, at least, not fully), and defense counsel is generally free to communicate directly with

Massachusetts SJC: Rule 23 Governs Wage Act Claims, Rejected Offers of Judgment Do Not Moot Claims, and More

Every now and then a case comes along that rewards us class action nerds with an embarrassment of riches. Gammella v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., decided last week by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, is one such case. In it, the Court addressed a number of important class certification issues, some unique to Massachusetts law, and some that have close federal procedural analogues. And its resolution of those issues offers something to both plaintiffs and defendants.

Gammella is a wage and hour case. Plaintiff brought a claim under the Massachusetts Wage Act and the minimum fair wage law for his employer’s alleged violations of the “reporting pay” provision of Massachusetts regulations which, the Court explains, “requires employers to pay employees three hours’ wages at no less than the minimum wage if they report for a scheduled shift of three or more hours but are involuntarily dismissed before they have worked three hours.” He alleged that, on numerous occasions, he reported to work at defendant’s restaurants

Campbell-Ewald in Massachusetts

On March 6th, in Silva v. Todisco Services, Inc., Judge Kenneth Salinger, sitting in the Business Litigation Session of the Massachusetts Superior Court, held that a defendant’s tendering of the maximum amount of damages a plaintiff might recover in a putative class action did not moot either the plaintiff’s individual claims or the claims of putative class members. In rejecting defendant’s “pick-off” attempt, Judge Salinger aligned Massachusetts state court practice with federal case law, including the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez, and subsequent federal decisions. His reasons for doing so, while perhaps consistent with Massachusetts precedent, were somewhat different from the federal court rationale and could have unintended consequences.

In Campbell-Ewald, the Supreme Court held that an unaccepted offer of judgment does not moot a named plaintiff’s claim, and therefore cannot prevent a putative class action from moving forward. The Court based its decision on principles of contract law (once rejected, an

Bellerman v. Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. – Lack of Injury in Massachusetts Consumer Claims

In 2014, we posted about the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co.  In that case, plaintiffs sought relief under the Massachusetts consumer protection statute, G.L. c. 93A, because of the defendant utility’s alleged failure properly to prepare and plan for a major winter storm, and its allegedly deceptive communications made to consumers before and during the storm.  The SJC affirmed the trial court’s denial of class certification because plaintiffs could not establish that defendant’s conduct caused similar injury to consumers on a class-wide basis.

On remand, plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for class certification relying on a different liability theory – that they had suffered economic injury by overpaying for a level of emergency preparedness, required by Department of Public Utility regulations, which the defendant allegedly failed to provide.  This time a different trial court judge certified two classes under this diminution-in-value theory (a business customers class and a residential customers class), but